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The three research papers of this portfolio address the connection between defense 
relations and defense trade through exploration of three separate, though thematically related, 
questions.  The first paper, The Asia “Pivot”: Indications of Existence Through Analysis of 
Foreign Military Sales, examines the United States’ expressed “pivot” in foreign policy emphasis 
to the Asia-Pacific region to determine if a shift in focus has taken place or not.  The second 
paper, The Influence of Collective Defense Agreements on U.S. Foreign Military Sales, continues 
to leverage available statistical data for the Foreign Military Sales program and investigates the 
relationship between the seven collective defense agreements (CDA) that the United States is 
currently a party of, and the support offered by the United States to fellow CDA member nations 
under the Foreign Military Sales program.  The third research paper in the portfolio, Defense 
Trade in the United States-India Relationship, explores the nature of the relationship between the 
United States and India in the context of defense and security matters and identifies several 
impediments to strong relations between the United States and India in the defense arena, of 
which trade is arguably a significant obstacle.  The research in the portfolio finds that there is 
limited publically available data that allows for the measurement of the state of defense relations 
between the United States and other nations, however it argues that Foreign Military Sales 
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The three research papers that form the core of this research portfolio investigate 
the relationship between “defense relations” and “defense trade” as they relate to the 
United States.  Defense relations in the context examined throughout this portfolio refers 
to activities, interactions and interests where the United States Department of Defense is 
the lead organization.  The types of elements that fall under the umbrella of defense 
relations include, but are not limited to, military-to-military engagements; joint 
operational exercises between the United States and partner foreign nations; training; 
information exchanges; and weapons sales.  These types of activities and exchanges that 
are labelled with the defense relations moniker are not exclusive to the Department of 
Defense.  In fact, observers would note that several U.S. government bodies perform a 
significant role in all of the elements described.  For example, weapons sales touches the 
spheres of diplomacy and commerce.  The portion of the broader international relations 
discipline that defense relations carves out for itself is identified by the function of its 
subordinate elements.  Activities, such as military-to-military engagements, training and 
weapons sales that are undertaken and have the main objective of meeting, or support the 
meeting of, a security objective that the Department of Defense is responsible for are 
categorized as defense relations in the context of this thesis portfolio. 
A practical example of an activity that falls under this definition of defense 
relations is the sale of F-16 fighter aircraft to India.  Due to the destructive nature of this 
type of equipment, several governmental levels of approval are understandably required 




greatest proponent and facilitator of this type of transaction, which is a previously 
identified key characteristic of defense relations, because of the Department’s organic 
technical expertise required to implement the transaction and the strategic security 
objectives that are achieved by providing India’s military with the means to defend itself 
and enhance stability in South Asia.  Other organizations, such as the Department of State 
and even the Department of Commerce perform roles in this type of activity given the 
intersection of diplomatic and economic interests, however, the Department of Defense is 
arguably the preeminent organization.  To provide additional context for this example, if 
roles were reversed, and instead of the sale of F-16 aircraft, it is the sale of components 
needed for nuclear power plants that is under consideration, the Department of Energy 
may be the most likely organization to serve as the lead element; though the Departments 
of State, Defense and even Commerce would likely perform some functions in the 
transaction and hold organizational interests in its outcomes.  Ultimately, this thesis 
portfolio seeks to draw attention to the meaningfulness of examining the impact of 
defense relations on broader U.S. national security objectives and more specifically, 
consider the unique and valuable role that the Foreign Military Sales program performs 
within defense relations.  
The concept of defense trade, within the scope of the research that makes up this 
thesis portfolio, is understood to be the trade of equipment, technology and training that 
has military application.  The three research studies in this thesis portfolio heavily 
explore the United States’ Foreign Military Sales program, which is a mechanism for the 
United States (at its expense) to provide sensitive military technology to foreign nations 




to foreign partner nations shows that diplomatic and political considerations are 
significant factors in these types of transactions, however, other motivations, that are 
commercial in nature, are also observed.   Private industry manufacturers of military 
hardware seek to generate profit through the sale of their goods and these businesses 
support a strong lobbying effort to influence policy-makers in the Legislative and 
Executive branches whose approval is required to conduct revenue generating arms sales.  
The United States Government for its own part has an inherent desire to support a healthy 
and robust defense industrial base that has an enduring capacity to support the research 
and development of military hardware and is able to maintain production lines that may 
have fulfilled the United States’ initial requirement for a specific weapons system, but 
since achievement of that goal, may have an opportunity to sell additional equipment to 
foreign countries until the United States is once again in a position to purchase additional 
items.  These commercial and economic motivations are important to consider when 
assessing diplomatic and political factors for arms sales because each of these factors 
may exist simultaneously and provide insight into the overarching role of arms sales in 
defense relations.   
These two concepts are significant given that the United States is generally 
regarded as a first-rate military power on the world stage with significant interaction in 
the defense arena with nearly every other nation in the world.  Similarly, the United 
States’ defense industrial base is capable of producing military equipment that is un-
paralleled in its sophistication, capabilities and performance by all except for a small, 




two concepts of defense relations and defense trade, as it relates to the United States, is 
warranted.            
The three research papers of this portfolio address the connection between 
defense relations and defense trade through exploration of three separate, though 
thematically related, questions.  The first paper, The Asia “Pivot”: Indications of 
Existence Through Analysis of Foreign Military Sales, examines the United States’ 
expressed “pivot” in foreign policy emphasis to the Asia-Pacific region to determine if a 
shift in focus has taken place or not.  The paper recognizes the importance of U.S. 
defense relations with Asia-Pacific countries and seeks to identify if a “pivot” exists in 
the context of defense relations.  Through analysis of the United States’ provision of arms 
to other nations under its Foreign Military Sales program, the paper argues that evidence 
exists which supports the theory that the U.S. pivot to the Asia-Pacific region is a real 
phenomenon. 
The second paper in the thesis portfolio, The Influence of Collective Defense 
Agreements on U.S. Foreign Military Sales, continues to leverage available statistical 
data for the Foreign Military Sales program and seeks to address another area at the 
intersection of defense relations and defense trade.  This second paper investigates the 
relationship between the seven collective defense agreements (CDA) that the United 
States is currently a party of, and the support offered by the United States to fellow CDA 
member nations under the Foreign Military Sales program.  This second paper observes 
that the seven collective defense agreements currently in force have the same ostensible 
objective of establishing a framework to respond to armed aggression against one of the 




second paper shows that nations that are signatories of the Inter-American Treaty of 
Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) receive significantly less arms support under the U.S. 
Foreign Military Sales program than any of their counterpart nation that are part of the 
other six collective defense agreements.   
The research conducted for the second paper also observes that the language used 
in the seven collective defense agreements is similar with the exception of treaty articles 
that address how signatory states will consult with each other to address issues that fall 
under the auspices of the treaty.  The second paper hypothesizes that there is a potential 
link between treaty language and Foreign Military Sales and argues that the Rio Treaty 
nations are less likely to receive arms support from the United States under its Foreign 
Military Sales program because the treaty uses specific and extensive language for 
outlining the consultation and decision making processes for the defense pacts.   As a 
result, the paper argues that the United States is less likely to devote limited resources 
under its Foreign Military Sales program to nations that are members of a weak and less 
capable defense pact. 
The final research paper in the portfolio, Defense Trade in the United States-India 
Relationship, explores the nature of the relationship between the United States and India 
in the context of defense and security matters.  The third paper identifies several 
impediments to strong relations between the United States and India in the defense arena.  
These obstacles include the United States’ relationship with Pakistan that has varied since 
the September 11th, 2001 attacks; and the antagonistic relationship between Pakistan and 
India.  Similarly, the paper notes that the friendly relationship between India and Russia, 




development of U.S.-India defense relations.  Lastly, the research paper identifies the 
issue of nuclear proliferation as a significant historical barrier to the successful 
development of U.S.-India defense relations.   
Defense Trade in the United States-India Relationship observes that India desires 
the type of high-end weapons technology that the United States can provide, and that the 
United States seeks emerging nations such as India that can afford to purchase U.S. 
military hardware.  The paper argues that despite the geopolitical impediments of India’s 
relations with Russia and Pakistan and pursuit of nuclear weapons technology, defense 
trade is an area where the United States and India can improve their defense relationship. 
The contribution that these individual research studies, and this overarching thesis 
portfolio, make, is the advancement of what is currently known about the role that 
defense trade plays in the United States’ defense relations with other nations.  A 
significant body of scholarship exists that focuses on arms trade and on international 
relations and their various sub-fields, however, there is a gap in existing research that 
attempts to explore the nature of the relationship between these fields of study in the 
manner attempted by the research contained in this portfolio.  Specifically, this portfolio 
strongly focuses on the United States’ defense trade with other nations with an emphasis 
on the Foreign Military Sales program.  Through examination of the interaction of trade 
and relations in the context of the United States and its Foreign Military Sales program, 











Public statements from President Obama and senior government officials 
unquestionably indicate the Obama Administration’s desire for a shift in U.S. foreign 
policy attention towards the Asia-Pacific region.  This renewed focus on the Pacific has 
often been labeled a "pivot" or a "rebalance," with numerous examples of anecdotal 
evidence of a desire to divert greater attention to the Asia-Pacific region readily available.  
The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review states that a specific goal of the re-balance to the 
Asia-Pacific region is to “… improve the capabilities and capacity of partner nations…” 
in order to “…contribute to the stability of the region.”1 The Quadrennial Defense 
Review provides the Department of Defense’s strategic framework for implementation of 
the Obama Administration’s overall increased emphasis of focus on the Asia-Pacific 
region that is outlined in the May 2010 National Security Strategy.  This important policy 
document specifically notes that United States alliances with Japan, South Korea, 
Australia, the Philippines and Thailand are the “…bedrock of security in Asia and a 
foundation of prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region.”2  These countries are notably 
identified in this paper’s investigation as top recipients of military aid from the United 
States through the Foreign Military Sales program. 
  Additionally, a March, 2012 report produced by the Congressional Research 
Service titled Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration’s ‘Rebalancing’ Toward 
                                                          
1   United States Department of Defense, 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, (March 2014), 35 




Asia highlights the Obama Administration’s stated intention in 2011 to expand the United 
States’ role in the Asia-Pacific region.3  Further, in her November, 2011 article in 
Foreign Policy, former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton provides a concise 
overview of the motivating factors and goals for the United States’ renewed focus on the 
Asia-Pacific region.  In this article, Secretary Clinton writes: 
“As the war in Iraq winds down and America begins to withdraw its 
forces from Afghanistan, the United States stands at a pivot point.  Over 
the last 10 years, we have allocated immense resources to those two 
theaters.  In the next 10 years, we need to be smart and systematic about 
where we invest time and energy, so that we put ourselves in the best 
position to sustain our leadership, secure our interests, and advance our 
values.  One of the most important tasks of American statecraft over the 
next decade will therefore be to lock in a substantially increased 
investment – diplomatic, economic, strategic, and otherwise – in the Asia-
Pacific region.”4 
 
Given the stated intention to dedicate focus and resources on the Asia-Pacific 
region over the past several years, as observed in substantive policy documents, a central 
question that emerges is whether or not the U.S. “pivot” toward the Asia-Pacific region is 
a real phenomenon?  This paper attempts to show, through an analysis of the U.S. arms 
trade for the period 2000-2012 that a pivot does exist in terms of U.S. security objectives.  
This is indicated by evidence of resources and priorities, in the form of U.S. arms sales, 
                                                          
3 Mark E. Manyin, Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration’s “Rebalancing” Toward 
Asia, (March 2012): 1 




being shifted from Europe to the Asia-Pacific, while sales to the Middle East region 
remain largely unaffected. 
 
II. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
Nations that enjoy friendly relations with the United States have several available 
avenues to obtain arms from the U.S.  One of these avenues is the Foreign Military Sales 
(FMS) program.  Under FMS, the United States Government, through the Department of 
Defense and in coordination with the Department of State, provides arms directly to 
partner nations.  As a result of this procedural framework, there is a diplomatic and 
foreign policy connotation with transactions conducted under the FMS program that 
makes its arms transaction metrics relevant to this paper’s goal in determining if there is 
evidence of a U.S. pivot to Asia in defense relations.  
The available literature tends to agree that obtaining accurate data with respect to 
the global arms trade is difficult.  With respect to the United States and its Foreign 
Military Sales program, datasets that show broad metrics for US arms trade with other 
nations is available, primarily through Congressionally mandated reports produced by the 
Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA).  For the purposes of this paper, DSCA’s 
Fiscal Year Series reports of total annual arms sales provided by the United States to 
partner countries was analyzed.  The arms sales metrics under the program provided in 
these sources are used as a proxy for the general level of importance placed by the United 
States on recipient nations as represented by arms sales.  This paper focuses on the 2000-
2012 period due to the universally recognized effect that the September 11, 2001 attacks 




a representation of the United States’ defense relationships immediately preceding the 
2001 attacks and serves as a significant relationship milestone for the U.S. that clearly 
begins before any discussion of a pivot in priorities toward the Asia-Pacific region.  It 
should be noted that 2012 is the most recent year for which reliable arms trade data is 
currently available through the aforementioned reports that are published by the 
Departments of Defense.  In order to fully appreciate the relevance of FMS arms 
transactional data, a greater understanding of the FMS program is required. 
 
A. Foreign Military Sales 
The Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program is a security assistance program that is 
authorized by the Arms Export Control Act (AECA).  Through FMS, eligible foreign 
nations have the opportunity to receive defense arms and services from the United States.  
These arms and services come in several forms and sizes and can range from items such 
as small arms, to larger pieces of equipment with operational and strategic value, such as 
naval vessels and aircraft.  FMS transactions also can include training provided by U.S. 
military personnel to partner nation militaries.  Before the U.S. can provide defense 
articles to a foreign nation under the FMS program, the President is required to make a 
determination that the prospective receiving nation is eligible under the AECA.  
Additionally, unless exempt, notification to Congress is required in advance of any 
formal agreement made by the United States to provide arms to a foreign nation.5 
 
                                                          
5 Defense Security Cooperation Agency. "Security Assistance Management Manual." . 




Transactions under the FMS program are conducted on a government-to-
government basis.  On the U.S. end, the program is administered by the Department of 
Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency under guidance and input from the 
Department of State.  DSCA serves as an intermediary agent between the U.S. defense 
industry sector and the partner foreign nation.  The U.S. defense industrial base sells the 
arms that it manufactures directly to the Pentagon, who in turn provides them to the 
foreign partner nation; the foreign partner nation does not negotiate directly with U.S. 
defense industries under FMS.  On the foreign nation side of the transaction, a 
requirement under the FMS program is that the receiving foreign partner is an entity that 
is “under the direction and control of the foreign government’s ministry that is 
responsible for defense matters.”  This entity is generally a nation’s ministry of defense.6  
Figure 1 provides a visual depiction of the FMS process for arms that the United States 
approves for delivery to a partner nation. 









                                                          
6 Defense Security Cooperation Agency. "Security Assistance Management Manual." . 




Figure 1.  Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Process For Approved Delivery of Arms 
Source: Data adapted from Defense Security Cooperation Agency. "Security Assistance Management 
Manual." . http://www.samm.dsca.mil/chapter/chapter-5 (accessed May 6, 2014).     
 
The government-to-government characteristic of Foreign Military Sales 
transactions, as well as the specific involvement of the President and the Congress, is 
significant for the purposes of this paper because it illustrates the national importance that 
an FMS transaction represents for the United States.  When arms are provided to foreign 
nations, they are done so with careful planning and input from numerous agencies and 
departments in the Executive branch, and with significant oversight from the Legislative 
branch.  Consideration for the diplomatic, military, economic and even political factors of 
an FMS transaction is vital evidence that there are broad implications for such sales and 
that the approval, or denial, of an FMS sale is valuable evidence of the importance that 
the United States places on relationships with specific foreign nations and regions.  
Example 1 provides an overview of the FMS process for an approved delivery of arms or 
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services to a foreign military.  This process is a summarization of the Security Assistance 
Management Manual (SAMM) produced by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. 
 
B. The Role of Arms in Defense Relations 
This paper is built upon past research that was discovered through a survey of the 
available literature that analyzed the US arms trade and the role that it plays in the United 
States’ relationships with other nations.  One scholarly effort that is an example of this 
past research was conducted by Neha Khanna and Duane Chapman, who analyzed the 
global conventional weapons trade between 1989 and 1999 in their 2009 paper “Guns 
and Oil: An Analysis Of Conventional Weapons Trade In The Post-Cold War Era.”  In 
this study, Khanna and Chapman argue that the main reason for the significant transfer of 
weapons to the Persian Gulf region is a result of the “enormous value of wealth there” 
and the “dependence of Western Economies on access to the relatively cheap and steady 
supply of crude oil.”7  The analytical framework of Khanna and Chapman’s work is 
relevant to the purpose of this study in that they both use arms trade as a dependent 
variable.  Where the two works primarily differ are on the time period observed and the 
focus of the trade.  Khanna and Chapman focus on the global arms trade during the 
decade immediately following the end of the Cold War, whereas this paper focuses 
specifically on the US arms trade in the period beginning immediately before the 
September 2001 attacks and 2012. 
A second scholarly study with relevance to this paper is John Sislin’s “Arms As 
Influence: The Determinants of Successful Influence.”  In this work, Sislin “explores the 
                                                          
7 Neha Khanna and Duane Chapman, “Guns and Oil: An Analysis of Conventional Weapons 




conditions” under which the United States has successfully used its arms exports to 
“manipulate” countries that receive them.8  The article’s focus on the reasons why the 
United States supplies arms to other nations, particularly to control or influence these 
nation’s actions, is directly applicable to the goal of this paper.  Arms are an important 
tool for the United States when interacting with partner countries in the defense arena.  
This paper, however, seeks to explore more deeply how FMS as a specific program, helps 
illuminate the importance that the United States places on relationships with partner 
nations. 
Lastly, Jonathan Caverley and Ethan Kapstein’s paper “Power or Profit? The 
United States and the International Arms Trade” explores the advantageous position of 
the United States’ arms industry to collect or forego “economic rents” to “advance its 
geopolitical ends.”9  Caverley and Kapstein’s study cogently discusses a core element of 
this study which is that FMS is a tool for the United States to achieve foreign policy and 
security objectives.  What this paper seeks to address that Caverley and Kapstein do not, 
is what the use of the FMS program indicates regarding the nature of the relationship 






                                                          
8 John Sislin, “Arms as Influence: The Determinants of Successful Influence,” The Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 38, no. 4 (Dec. 1994): 665.  





C. “Pivot” To Asia 
In addition to the scholarly literature that focuses on the role of arms trade in 
defense relations, the focus of this paper also required a review of the existing literature 
that examines the United States’ “pivot” to Asia.  Several articles addressed the question 
of what type of relationship should exist between the United States and Asia-Pacific 
allies following a pivot.  David W. Barno, Nora Bensahal and Travis Sharp, in their 
article “Pivot but Hedge: A Strategy for Pivoting to Asia While Hedging in the Middle 
East,” recommend that the United States focus greater attention on the Asia-Pacific 
region, but maintain interest in the Middle East region.  Barno, Bensahal and Sharp label 
this strategy as “pivot but hedge” and recommends three actions to implement it.  First, 
they recommend that the United States “exercise caution when cutting the defense 
budget.  Second, the U.S. should “give the military services greater leadership roles in 
specific regions, such as assigning the naval and air forces the lead role in the Asia-
Pacific, and ground forces the lead in the Middle East.  Third and lastly, The U.S. should 
“maintain ground forces” as an effective deterrent to promote stability.10  The authors 
recommend their strategy based on the emerging economic importance of the Asia-
Pacific region and the continuing volatility of the Middle East region.  In the article, the 
suggested strategy is framed in the context of three obstacles: declining defense budgets, 
current division of military responsibilities and resources dedicated to regions and 
nations, and availability of ground forces that could be employed against future 
conflicts.11 
                                                          
10 David W. Barno, Nora Bensahal and Travis Sharp, “Pivot But Hedge: A Strategy for Pivoting to 
Asia While Hedging in the Middle East,” Orbis (Spring 2012): 158. 




Similar to Barno, Bensahal and Sharp, Kenneth D. Chase and Robert E. Hunter 
explore in their respective articles the ramifications for U.S.-Europe relations that are 
caused by a pivot to Asia.  In “Trans-Atlantic Implications of the Evolving U.S. 
Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific Region,” Chase argues that severe financial pressure to 
reduce the U.S. defense budget resulted in a new “strategic defense policy” that calls for 
a “strategic rebalance” to the Asia-Pacific region.  Chase further asserts that this 
rebalance will in turn have an impact on U.S. security interests in Europe, primarily 
affecting its relationship with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).12  The 
article evaluates potential future scenarios of the rebalance that includes reduced financial 
resources and participation in NATO as well as a shift in leadership and “operational 
ambition” in the alliance.13 
Hunter’s article “U.S.–European Relations in the ‘‘Greater’’ Middle East” 
complements the research conducted by Kenneth Chase in that it offers a view of what 
the United States’ future relationships and interests in Europe and the Middle East region 
will look like following a pivot to Asia strategy.  Specifically, it argues that the U.S. will 
“remain deeply engaged” in Europe, but also claims that NATO will need to accept 
“added responsibilities” in Africa and the Middle East.14 
Feng Liu conducts research that is similar to that of Chase and Hunter but offers a 
different perspective.  In “China, the United States, and the East Asian Security Order”, 
Liu argues that that the United States and China have historically pursued two objectives-
“security expectations and economic benefits”-which have contributed to stability in 
                                                          
12 Kenneth D. Chase, Trans-Atlantic Implications of the Evolving U.S. Rebalance to the Asia-
Pacific Region (2013): 9. 
13 Ibid, 12-19. 
14 Robert E. Hunter, “U.S.-European Relations in the ‘Greater’ Middle East,” American Foreign 




Asia.  A main conclusion of Liu’s research is that the U.S. pivot to Asia policy threatens 
the stability achieved by these two objectives.15 
Chase, Hunter and Liu offer valuable contributions to the examination of the Asia 
pivot, however, their research differs from the goal of this paper in that they provide an 
assessment of the potential future effects on U.S. relations with other nations that the 
pivot to Asia could cause, but they do not evaluate if the pivot exists.  Also, it can be 
argued that the work of Chase and Hunter is based on the premise that a pivot has, or will 
occur, which is not necessarily compatible with an investigation that questions whether or 
not a pivot exists.   
In addition to research that illustrates the potential effects of a pivot, the available 
literature also provides investigation of the potential underlying causes of the pivot.  
Douglas Stuart’s study “San Francisco 2.0: Military Aspects of the U.S. Pivot toward 
Asia” asserts that the United States’ decline in economic power will force it to “convince 
its friends and allies to take greater responsibility for regional security” in the Asia-
Pacific region and the pivot strategy is a realization of this inevitability.  As part of the 
research study’s methodology, the author employ’s Joseph Nye’s model of evaluating the 
United States’ various bilateral and multilateral alliances in the Asia-Pacific region in 
terms of “ideal” and “material” resources.  In this context, ideal resources are defined as 
the “appreciation that members of a regional organization have for that organization,” 
and material resources as “the capability of the organization to accomplish the tasks that 
it commits to.”16  Ultimately, the article concludes that the United States is approaching a 
                                                          
15 Feng Liu, “China, the United States, and the East Asian Security Order,” Issues & Studies 49, 
no. 1 (March 2013): 99. 
16 Douglas Stuart, “San Francisco 2.0: Military Aspects of the U.S. Pivot Toward Asia,” Asian 




point where it will “no longer be in a position to guarantee the stability of the Asia-
Pacific by its unilateral actions and forward military presence.”17   
Michael Evans complements Stuart’s research in his article “American Defence 
Policy and the Challenge of Austerity: Some Implications for Southeast Asia,” where he 
examines the implications of the U.S. domestic budget crisis and the rise of China as 
reasons for the U.S. pivot.  A key element of Evan’s article is that he notes the skepticism 
of countries in Southeast Asia with respect to the United States’ fortitude to remain 
committed to a pivot that focuses attention on the Pacific region.  This paper, in its 
investigation of the Foreign Military Sales program, is a natural, progressive step that 
builds upon the work conducted by Stuart, Evans and Liu in that they provide a 
foundation that explores the factors that could cause a pivot, while this study seeks 
evidence of whether a pivot took place or not. 
  In addition to research into the underlying causes for the pivot and the potential 
relationships that could develop should a pivot come to fruition, the scholarly literature 
consists of investigations into the efficacy of the pivot phenomenon.  A principal example 
of this research is Euan Graham’s “Southeast Asia in the US Rebalance: Perceptions 
from a Divided Region.”  In the article, Graham explores the perceptions of Southeast 
Asian countries regarding the Asia “pivot” and notes that the Obama administration’s 
strategy to date has been questioned with respect to the United States’ “durability and 
commitment” to the pivot.18  Graham’s survey of regional attitudes draws heavily upon a 
National Bureau for Asian Research report on views towards the pivot as well as the 
                                                          
17 Ibid, 216. 
18 Euan Graham, “Southeast Asia in the US Rebalance: Perceptions from a Divided Region,” 




opinions of regional commentators.19  A main difference between Graham’s approach 
and that of this study is that Graham tends to evaluate if the pivot is effective, whereas 
this study seeks to determine if the pivot actually exists.  Additionally, Graham’s study 
assesses that a popular hypothesis regarding a “…transfer of resources and strategic 
attention from the Middle East and Europe to Asia” has turned out to be “somewhat 
underwhelming”20 contradicts a primary conclusion resulting from this author’s analysis 
of Foreign Military Sales data which suggests that arms resources have actually shifted 
from Europe to Asia while leaving the Middle East largely undiminished. 
   
III. RESULTS  
When the Foreign Military Sales data is analyzed in the context of the Department 
of Defense’s geographic combatant command organizational structure, which organizes 
countries into regionally grouped areas of responsibility for the military, three trends 
emerge that indicate the existence of a pivot as a shift in attention by the United States 
towards the Asia-Pacific region at the ostensible expense of Europe.  These trends are 
visible in Figure 2, which is based on FMS data reported by the Defense Security 
Cooperation Agency in its Fiscal Year Series reports for Congress.   
In 2012, countries that fall under the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area 
of responsibility that is responsible for the Middle East, and the Pacific Command 
(PACOM) area of responsibility that encompasses the Asia-Pacific region, comprise a 
combined total of nine out of the top ten individual countries that received arms from the 
United States.  The European Command (EUCOM), which is composed primarily of 
                                                          
19 Ibid, 308. 




European nations, is somewhat ironically represented as the tenth country by Israel, 
which is geographically located in the Middle East region, but falls under the 
responsibility of the military command that covers European countries.  The second trend 
is that since 2008, PACOM countries have collectively received more arms, when 
measured by total sales in USD, than EUCOM countries for every year during the 2000-
2012 period, with the exception of 2008.  Data for years 2011 and 2012 show the most 
dramatic difference between aggregate EUCOM and PACOM spending, with PACOM 
eclipsing EUCOM spending by approximately $8.5 billion and $8.8 billion, respectively, 
for 2011 and 2012.  The third trend that indicates an emerging significance of the Asia-
Pacific region to the United States is that between 2000 and 2012, among the ten greatest 
recipients of arms through FMS, EUCOM countries are the greatest recipient for three 
years; PACOM countries are the greatest recipient for one year; and CENTCOM 
countries are the greatest recipient for nine years.  This trend clearly shows that 
CENTCOM remains of importance to the United States, and while PACOM only ranks as 
highest recipient out of all of the combatant commands only once in comparison to 
EUCOM, that appearance is in 2011, after the declared “pivot,” whereas all of EUCOM’s 
highest rankings occur nearly a decade earlier.  A significant observation to note is that 
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Figure 2.  Top Ten FMS Sales (By Combatant Command) 
 
Source: Data adapted from Defense Security Cooperation Agency,  Fiscal Year Series: As of September 30, 
2012.  Washington: Government Printing Office, 2013.  
 
When arms sales under FMS are analyzed by individual country, Asia-Pacific 
nations receive greater amounts of arms as measured in US Dollars than European 
nations, particularly from 2008 to 2012 (the latest year FMS data is available).  Table A1 
contains the FMS transaction data for individual countries for years 2008-2012.22  While 
the data indicates a trend that supports the theory that the U.S. pivot to Asia exists at the 
expense of Europe, there are fluctuations that are difficult to account for.   
Australia and Israel are respective members of the Asia-Pacific region and Europe 
(for the purposes of this study, Israel falls under the European Command area of 
responsibility and not the Central Command which covers Middle Eastern nations) and 
are one of the top ten recipients for arms under the FMS program for every year from 
2008 to 2012.  During that time frame, Australia receives a greater amount of arms than 
Israel in a trend that moves upward from $1.097 billion in 2008 to $3.025 billion in 2012.  
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During this same period, Israel’s receipt of arms declined from $1.027 billion in 2008 to 
$1.025 billion in 2012.  2010 appears to be an anomalous year where Israel outpaces 
Australia in the receipt of arms, where Australia continues its upward trend by increasing 
from $800 million in 2009 to $1.4 billion in 2010, while Israel shows the only increase in 
its otherwise downward trend by jumping from $600 million in 2009 to $3.9 billion in 
2010, before decreasing again to $1.4 billion in 2011.  Despite the jump in sales for Israel 
in 2010, the country shows a dramatic decline in both list ranking, when compared to 
other nations, and amount or arms received for the last three years of the data when 
compared to the Middle East and Asia-Pacific region countries that round out the top ten 
countries list.  In 2012, Israel is the only EUCOM country in the list of top ten arms 
recipients under FMS, whereas four Asia-Pacific nations, represented by Taiwan, 
Australia, Japan and Indonesia appear on the list.     
To reiterate the statement made earlier: the analysis of individual countries as an 
indicator of a pivot to Asia is less conclusive than an examination of regionally grouped 
nations.  It is not as readily apparent that a pivot exists in the data for individual nations 
due to the greater fluctuations in trends of countries and the limited time span that data is 
available, however, the final two years of the available data (2011 and 2012), do suggest 
that a pivot has occurred when defined in the context of defense relations as represented 
by arms transfers.  This argument is reinforced when the more definitive metrics shown 
in the aggregate, regional totals as represented by the geographic combatant command 
nations is taken into account.  Future research that has the opportunity to view data that 




beyond 2012 will ultimately determine if such a pivot actually existed from a Foreign 
Military Sales optic.   
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
What this paper contributes, through its examination of arms transactions under 
the FMS program, is early evidence that a U.S. pivot to the Asia-Pacific region exists in 
the defense relationship arena.  This paper adds to the existing literature that primarily 
consists of research that explains the reasons for a pivot and what a pivot would, or 
should, look like, by offering proof that the pivot phenomena is real.  Arms sales, by their 
nature, are an instrument of US foreign policy due to the requirement for approval by the 
US Departments of State and Defense for their sale to a foreign country, and the 
involvement of the President and Congress in these transactions.  Daniel Twining, in his 
article “America’s Grand Design in Asia,” provides further discussion of the US 
emphasis on Asian nations with respect to its foreign and security policy and cogently 
explains that a potential goal for the United States in the South Asian region is to balance 
the regional influence of China.  Specifically, Twining states that “U.S. policy seeks to 
build and bind together friendly centers of power in Asia to help maintain a regional 
balance that preserves U.S. interests and values as China rises.”23  Twining further 
explains that through its policies, “The United States is trying to build strength in its 
Asian partners, not subordinate or contain them in Cold War-type alliance structures in 
which the United States institutionalizes its own dominance.”24  One significant way that 
the United States can achieve these objectives is through the supply of arms to Asian 
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nations.  Future examination of the role of these arms transfers in defense relations will 

























The Influence of Collective Defense Agreements on U.S. Foreign Military Sales 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States’ 2015 discretionary budget for its Department of Defense is 
over $495 billion.25  This is one measurement of the extensive defense relationships that 
the United States maintains with foreign partner nations.  In 2013, the latest year that data 
is available, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency reported that the United States 
provided almost $24 billion in arms and defense articles to partner nations under its 
Foreign Military Sales program.26  What these two incredible statistics illustrate is that 
the United States is thoroughly engaged in the defense arena.   
Currently, the United States is a party to seven Collective Defense Agreements 
that date back to as early as 1947.  Fifty four individual nations are party to these seven 
agreements which include: Security Treaty Between the United States, Australia, and 
New Zealand (ANZUS) (September 1, 1951); North Atlantic Treaty Organization Treaty 
(April 4, 1949); Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of 
the Philippines (August 30, 1951); Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (Manila 
Pact)( September 8, 1954); Security Treaty Between the United States and Japan 
(September 8, 1951); Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic 
of Korea (October 1, 1953); and the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio 
Treaty).27  These Collective Defense Agreements are important in any examination of 
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U.S. defense relations because they formally commit the United States to come to the aid 
of treaty member nations in the event of armed aggression.   
This study examines the relationship between the United States’ Foreign Military 
Sales (FMS) program and the nations that are party to one of the seven Collective 
Defense Agreements (CDA) that the United States is also a member of.  Specifically, this 
study observes that there is an imbalance between the level of arms, as measured in 2013 
U.S. Dollars, that are provided by the United States to partner CDA nations through the 
FMS program.  The study observed that nations that are party to the Inter-American 
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) receive significantly less arms under the 
FMS program than members of the other Collective Defense Agreements.  The study’s 
main hypothesis is that there is a correlation between language used in the Collective 
Defense Agreements and the level of arms provided by the United States to its partner 
nations, and observes that the Rio Treaty contains language that separates it from the 
other six treaties, and that this discrepancy is a contributing reason for the reduced level 
of arms support under the FMS program when compared to the other comparable defense 
treaties.   
 
II.  ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
The study’s methodology for examining the relationship between Foreign 
Military Sales transactions and Collective Defense Agreements consisted of examining 
the Foreign Military Sales transactions for the 54 nations that are members of one of the 
seven Collective Defense Agreements with the United States to identify any significant 




Series (As of September 30, 2013) published by the Defense Security Cooperation 
Agency.  This data provides the total amount of defense articles, measured in 2013 U.S. 
Dollars, that was provided to other nations by the United States under its Foreign Military 
Sales program between the years 1950 and 2013.28   
The study then analyzed the texts of the individual Collective Defense 
Agreements and employed a framework that identified and categorized common elements 
of information that formed the building blocks for the treaties.  This resulted in the 
identification and consolidation of 11 categories of information that converge to form the 
basis of each treaty.  These 11 elements and their description are: 
 
Preamble 
The preamble section of the treaties provide generalized justification for 
why the parties require a defense pact through the treaty and offers some 
justification for the legitimacy of a collective defense pact.  For instance, 
in the Security Treaty Between the United States, Australia, and New 
Zealand (ANZUS), the treaty notes that “the United States already has 
arrangements pursuant to which its armed forces are stationed in the 
Philippines, and has armed forces and administrative responsibilities in the 
Ryukyus…”29  In the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (Manila 
Pact), the parties indicate that their defense agreement, and the actions 
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proposed under it, are legitimate because they are “…in accordance with 
the Charter of the United Nations…”30  
 
Peaceful Settlement of Disputes 
Several of the treaties include articles where the member nations vow to 
resolve disputes peacefully.  These sections of the treaty provide the 
following text that is nearly identical in each document:  “The Parties 
undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any 
international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in 
such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not 
endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or 
use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United 
Nations.”31 
 
United Nations Responsibilities 
Similar to the peaceful settlement of disputes category, several of the 
treaties include the following clause regarding provisions provided under 
the United Nations charter: “This Treaty does not affect and shall not be 
interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties 
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under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United 
Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.”32  
 
Consultation 
These elements of the Collective Defense Agreements note that member 
nations will consult with each other whenever their territorial security is 
threatened.33  These passages also establish and provide the framework for 
deliberative bodies, usually referred to as a council, where the member 
nations will interact to make decisions.34  
 
Ratification 
These elements of the treaty identify the conditions under which the treaty 
is ratified and enters into force.  They include administrative instructions 
for where signed treaties are to be deposited upon adoption by a member 
nation and the responsibility of the designated recipient nation for 
notifying other nations upon receipt of a ratified treaty.35  
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These treaty components outline the terms and notification procedures 
under which a nation cancels its membership in the treaty and its 
organizations.36  Treaty components falling under this category also 




The Collective Defense Agreements generally contain articles which 
explain that the provisions of the treaty do not conflict with other 
agreements between the treaty party nations and third party nations or 
international organizations.  Treaty deconfliction articles also commit 
party nations to refrain from entering into future agreements that conflict 
with the treaty.38   
 
Treaty Review 
This provision sets the conditions for a future review of the treaty by its 
party nations.  The review is intended to determine if a treaty requires 
revisions due to an emerging political and security environment.39 
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Treaty expiration is similar to treaty review in that they both require a 
review of the treaty by party nations.  The main difference, however, is 
that treaty expiration articles set conditions for the treaty’s expiration, 
such as the requirement for a treaty to remain in force for a minimum 
period of one year before expiring.  Treaty review clauses provide a means 




These are provisions within the agreements where party nations agree to 
support each other in “maintaining” and “developing” their “collective 
capacity to resist armed attack.”41  These elements of the treaty focus 
mainly on providing material assistance in advance of or following acts of 
armed aggression, however, they differ from Mutual Defense provisions 




                                                          
40 Yale Law School, The Avalon Project.  Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and 
the Republic of Korea; October 1, 1953.  ONLINE.  2008.  Available: 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/kor001.asp [10 Nov. 2014] 
41 Yale Law School, The Avalon Project.  Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (Manila Pact); 
September 8, 1954.  ONLINE.  2008.  Available: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/usmu003.asp  





These treaty elements describe the conditions for actions that constitute an 
armed attack, such as the NATO Treaty’s declaration that an “Attack on 
one is an attack on all.”  Additionally, these elements outline the 
responsibilities of member states when one or more of them are attacked, 
and they outline specific response measures.  Elements under the mutual 
defense category of information may also prescribe objectives for 
responses to armed attacks against nations states, such as “restoring and 
maintaining international peace.”42   
 
Lastly, the study compared the Foreign Military Sales metrics with the 
categorized elements of the Collective Defense Agreements identified in this study to 
determine if there was a correlation between these two variables.   
The body of scholarly research on defense pacts and arms trade is extensive, 
however, little was found in the existing scholarship that connects the two subjects, 
particularly with respect to the United States’ support of Collective Defense Agreement 
nations through its Foreign Military Sales Program.  Areas of scholarship that have 
received previous focus that are relevant to this paper’s research goals include treaty text 
interpretation, arms trade, and collective defense agreements.  A survey of the relevant 
research in these fields follows.   
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A.  Treaty Text Interpretation 
Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell and James C. Miller, in their book 
Interpretation of Agreements and World Public Order explore the connection between 
methods for interpreting international agreements among nation states and international 
organizations, and the global security environment.  Specifically, their research examines 
the processes of communication, interpretation and application as they are applied to 
international agreements and argues that decision-makers who are responsible for the 
interpretation of international agreements play a significant role in affecting “world 
public order.”43  This work is similar to the investigation attempted by this paper in that 
interpretation is a factor in developing the Collective Defense Agreement categories as a 
variable for potential correlation, however, this study seeks to connect the variables of 
Foreign Military Sales levels between the United States and partner nations with the 
interpretation of Collective Defense Agreements to determine if a meaningful 
relationship exists, which is something that is not attempted in McDougal, Lasswell and 
Miller’s work. 
Interpreting the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty by Daniel H. Joyner explores 
the impact that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties has on the interpretation of 
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.  The relevance of Joyner’s research to this study is 
the fact that Joyner investigates how specific clauses in a treaty affect actions taken by 
party nations.  This cause and effect approach is similar to the approach taken in this 
study, which attempts to explain how a Collective Defense Agreement may affect 
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Foreign Military Sales, however, where the two studies differ is the fact that Joyner’s 
approach works with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty because the treaty contains 
very specific language, whereas the Collective Defense Agreements observed in this 
paper use both specific languages in some circumstances and fairly broad and generalized 
language in others, making Joyner’s approach ineffective in answering the question posed 
by this paper.44  
Treaties and Alliances of the World by Peter Calvert et al and Introduction to the 
Law of Treaties by Paul Reuter provide a foundation of knowledge for the subject of 
treaty interpretation that serves as a primer for this study’s examination of Collective 
Defense Agreements.  Treaties and Alliances of the World provides an overview of 
various treaties in force at the time of publication and categorizes them by subject.45  
Introduction to the Law of Treaties provides the accepted historical perspectives of 
international treaties and schools of thought on interpretation of these agreements.46 
B.  Arms Trade 
Arms Trade, Security and Conflict by Paul Levine and Ron Smith examines the 
costs and benefits of mutual defense alliances through the lens of the global arms trade 
industry.  The work of Levine and Smith is applicable to the goals of this study in that 
they both explore the role of arms trade in security pacts, however, where Levine and 
Smith focus on the potential benefits of arms trade as it relates to defense, this study 
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examines why arms trade may occur in the first place and what may cause variances in 
the level of the trade.47   
In The European Arms Trade, Martin Navias and Susan Willett explore why 
European nations trade arms with other countries and the mechanisms for doing so. 
Navias and Willett’s examination of why countries trade arms is similar to the focus of 
this paper, with two main differences.  First, Navias and Willett focus on European Trade 
with other countries whereas this study focuses mainly on the United States through a 
single mechanism (Foreign Military Sales program).  Second, Navias and Willett do not 
analyze the effect of international agreements such as mutual defense pacts as motivating 
factors for selling arms, but do look at the role of arms export regulations in the European 
Union and their impact on arms trade.48  Ian Anthony’s Russia and the Arms Trade does 
explore the reasons for arms trade for a single country (Russia), which is similar to one of 
the objectives of this study.  Anthony explores the impact of competition in the 
international market on arms transfers, and domestic considerations such as national 
policy and the relationship between the government and industry as they relate to arms 
trade.  This study fills a gap in the literature that investigates the role of treaties, which 
ostensibly is missing from previous efforts.49 
 
C.  Collective Defense Agreements 
There is extensive scholarly literature that focuses on Collective Defense 
Agreements from several angles.  Organizing for Peace by Daniel Cheever and H. Field 
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Haviland, Edgar S. Furniss Jr.’s A Re-Examination of Regional Arrangements and K.M. 
Panikkar’s Regionalism and Security outline the popular schools of thought on the 
subject.505152  Additional works explore the role of international institutions such as the 
United Nations in the development of mutual defense pacts, while others focus on a 
specific region of the world where nations have aligned for collective security reasons.53  
These works all provide concise studies of collective security arrangements but do not 
bring together the two variables of an agreement and the United States’ Foreign Military 
Sales Program, which is an objective of this paper’s research. 
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
A. Foreign Military Sales 
An analysis of the total Foreign Military Sales (FMS) aid received by 54 member 
nations between 1950 and 2013 when grouped by their collective defense agreements 
(Table 1) shows that the Rio Treaty group consistently receives less arms through FMS 
than its counterparts.  The Rio Treaty group is the sixth lowest recipient nation with an 
aggregate total of approximately $9.8 billion in aid during the 1950-2013 time period.  
The only other treaty group to receive less aid than the Rio Treaty group is the Philippine 
Treaty, which received $1.5 billion in FMS aid and consists of only the Republic of the 
Philippines.  When the average amount of aid received by an individual country during 
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the same 1950-2013 time frame is taken into consideration (Table 2), the Philippines 
received $35,469,667 in FMS aid annually, which is over twice as much aid as an 
individual Rio Treaty nation, which received on average $14,624,547 during the same 
time frame.  On the opposite end of the recipient spectrum, the North Atlantic Treaty bloc 
of nations received a combined total of over $130 billion in FMS support from the United 
States.  These figures clearly show that there is a wide disparity between the Rio Treaty 
and the other Collective Defense Agreements when the United States offers aid under the 
FMS program.54  
 
Table 1.  Total FMS Aid 1950-2013 (By Treaty) 
North Atlantic Treaty $130,905,761,000  
Southeast Asia Treaty $61,561,730,000  
Agreement Between The United States And Australia 
And New Zealand 
$28,508,495,000  
Republic Of Korea Treaty (Bilateral) $22,418,477,000  
Japanese Treaty (Bilateral) $20,978,569,000  
Rio Treaty $9,886,194,000  
Philippine Treaty (Bilateral) $1,596,135,000  
Source: Data adapted from Defense Security Cooperation Agency.  Fiscal Year Series: As Of September 





                                                          








Table 2.  Average FMS Aid Received By Individual Country 1950-2013 (By Treaty) 
Republic Of Korea Treaty (Bilateral) $509,510,841  
Japanese Treaty (Bilateral) $466,190,422  
Agreement Between The United States And Australia And 
New Zealand 
$316,761,056  
Southeast Asia Treaty $228,006,407  
North Atlantic Treaty $153,106,153  
Philippine Treaty (Bilateral) $35,469,667  
Rio Treaty $14,624,547  
Source: Data adapted from Defense Security Cooperation Agency.  Fiscal Year Series: As Of September 
30, 2013. 2014.  Washington, D.C.  
 
The highest amount of FMS aid received by a Rio Treaty member nation was 
Chile, which received $517,700,000 in 2002.  This is one of the 19 individual instances 
when a Rio Treaty nation was among the top 10 recipients in a given year.  The highest 
amount of FMS aid ever received by a nation that is a member of one of the seven 
Collective Defense Agreements was Australia, which received $4,002,228,000 in 2011.  
This amount is nearly eight times the largest amount of FMS aid received by a Rio Treaty 
member nation as represented by Chile in 2002.55   
When FMS transactions are viewed in the context of identifying which nations are 
the top and least recipients of aid for an individual year, a trend emerges that shows 
                                                          





NATO Treaty nations as consistent top recipients and Rio Treaty nations as consistent 
bottom-end recipients.  This trend holds for the entire 1950-2013 time period.  In the 
aggregate, NATO Treaty nations are among the top ten recipients for FMS aid in a given 
year a total of 385 times, whereas a Rio Treaty member nation is only a top ten recipient 
for a given year 19 times.  On average, NATO Treaty nations account for 6.3 of the 10 
highest recipients for FMS aid during the 1950-2013 time frame.  Conversely, Rio Treaty 
nations occupy, on average, 7.8 out of the bottom 10 recipients nations of FMS aid during 
the same time frame.56   
 
B.  Collective Defense Agreements Interpretation   
Using the treaty categories developed for this study, the analysis of the treaty texts 
identified that the contents of the Rio Treaty are comparable to its six peers in every area 
with the exception of its discussion of treaty elements that fall under the “consultation” 
category.  The Rio Treaty’s treatment of this consultation category is significantly more 
extensive and detailed than the other six Collective Defense Agreements.   The Rio 
Treaty dedicates 10 out of 26 of its articles to matters of consultation which explain how 
decisions will be made under the auspices of the Rio Treaty.57  This discussion of 
decision making potentially weakens the strength of the treaty in its ability to organize a 
collective defense pact among member nations and therefore may serve as a contributing 
reason for why the United States fails to provide the same level of arms support to these 
                                                          
56 Defense Security Cooperation Agency.  Fiscal Year Series: As Of September 30, 2013. 2014.  
Washington, D.C 
57 Yale Law School, The Avalon Project.  A Decade of American Foreign Policy 1941-1949 Rio De 
Janeiro Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security, August 15-September 2, 1947.  




treaty nations that it provides to the other six CDA countries, as shown in the FMS 
transaction data for 1950-2013.58   
The consultation articles of the Rio Treaty also establish a governing body, 
referred to as the “Organ of Consultation,” which is responsible for several functions in 
the defense pact.   One main function is that this body decides “…the measures which 
must be taken in case of aggression to assist the victim of the aggression or, in any case, 
the measures which should be taken for the common defense and for the maintenance of 
the peace and security of the continent.”59  Three additional treaties, including the 
Security Treaty Between the United States, Australia, and New Zealand (ANZUS), the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization Treaty, and the Southeast Asia Collective Defense 
Treaty (Manila Pact) also establish councils where collective defense matters under the 
auspices of the treaties can be deliberated by member nations.606162  The difference 
between these three treaties and the Rio Treaty with respect to the functions of these 
governing councils is that the former treaties use language that establishes a broad, 
general framework for the governing bodies, which allows for flexibility in how the 
bodies function and what their mission functions are; whereas the Rio Treaty is fairly 
specific in what the responsibilities of its governing bodies are.  An example of this 
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specific language is found in Article 6 of the Rio Treaty which states that “…the Organ 
of Consultation shall meet immediately in order to agree on the measures which must be 
taken in case of aggression to assist the victim of the aggression or, in any case, the 
measures which should be taken for the common defense and for the maintenance of the 
peace and security of the Continent.”  Similar specificity in actions taken by the Organ of 
Consultation can be found in Article 8 of the Rio Treaty which describes specific 
measures that may be taken in response to armed aggression directed against a member 
state, including: “…recall of chiefs of diplomatic missions; breaking of diplomatic 
relations; breaking of consular relations; partial or complete interruption of economic 
relations or of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, telephonic, and radiotelephonic or 
radiotelegraphic communications; and use of armed force.”63   
None of the other six Collective Defense Agreements are as specific in their 
language for potential responses to armed attacks against member nations.  The 
provisions for a council established by the Rio Treaty are significantly more descriptive 
and limited than comparable provisions found in other Collective Defense Agreements.  
The Security Treaty Between the United States, Australia, and New Zealand (ANZUS) 
simply establishes a council, however, the treaty mainly stipulates that it will consist of 
“…Foreign Ministers or their Deputies, to consider matters concerning the 
implementation of this Treaty” and that “the Council should be so organized as to be able 
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to meet at any time.”64  This language leaves greater flexibility than that found in the Rio 
Treaty.  
In addition to the specificity surrounding the roles and responsibilities of a 
governing council established by the Rio Treaty, the treaty also provides power to an 
entity outside of the Rio treaty when the Organ of Consultation is not immediately 
available.  Specifically, Article 12 states that “The Governing Board of the Pan American 
Union may act provisionally as an organ of consultation until the meeting of the Organ of 
Consultation referred to in the preceding Article takes place.”  Article 15 further explains 
that “The Governing Board of the Pan American Union, shall act in all matters 
concerning this Treaty as an organ of liaison among the Signatory States which have 
ratified this Treaty…”  Further, Article 16 states that “The decisions of the Governing 
Board of the Pan American Union referred to in Articles 13 and 15 above shall be taken, 
by an absolute majority of the Members entitled to vote.”   
What is significant about these provisions is that the Governing Board of the Pan 
American Union has the authority to make decisions on behalf of Rio Treaty member 
nations, however, these decisions are not necessarily done within the framework for a 
governing body that is established by other elements of the Rio Treaty.  Specifically, 
Article 17 states that two-thirds of signatory states must agree on decisions made by the 
Organ of Consultation, however, Article 16 notes that decisions under the Governing 
Board of the Pan American Union require only a majority.  This is tempered by 
provisions in Article 20 which notes that “no State shall be required to use armed force 
without its consent,” however, other actions, such as the “recall of chiefs of diplomatic 
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missions” or the “interruption of economic relations” as referenced in Article 8 would 
still, technically apply.   
These examples of complicated provisions of the Rio Treaty are one of the main 
elements that separates it from the other six Collective Defense Agreements that the 
United States is party to and may be one factor for the imbalanced supply of arms to the 
other six Collective Defense Agreement member nations under the Foreign Military Sales 
program.  The defense relationships established under these other six agreements are 
arguably more cohesive and less complicated than the relationship formed on the basis of 
the Rio Treaty.65   
What is evident in an analysis of the language and contents of the Collective 
Defense Agreements is that treaties that use specific and extensive language for outlining 
the decision making processes and institutions for the defense pacts are less likely to 
receive arms support from the United States under its Foreign Military Sales program.  
Conversely, treaties that use non-limiting language for deliberative processes tend to 
receive greater arms support.  No definitive explanation for why Collective Defense 
Agreements such as the Rio Treaty receive less arms from the United States is offered in 
the data examined, however, one plausible argument for this is that treaties that use 
extensive and specific language to outline roles and responsibilities with respect to 
responding to armed aggression may be indicative of defense pacts that are weak and lack 
cohesiveness.  One of the main purposes of a Collective Defense Agreement is to 
demonstrate to potential adversaries that its member nations are unified in their 
willingness to counter armed aggression.  A defense agreement that uses specific 
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language on what can and cannot be accomplished by its respective member nations may 
be viewed by the United States as one that is less effective than its peer defense 
agreements.  The United States, therefore, would reasonably devote its limited resources, 
as demonstrated by the costs (in U.S. Dollars) of the Foreign Military Sales program, to 
those defense agreements that use broader, more flexible language that is indicative of a 
stronger, more resolute defense pact. 
  An alternative hypothesis for why Rio Treaty member nations receive less arms 
than their Collective Defense Agreement counterparts is that Rio Treaty nations have less 
extensive defense requirements than counterparts such as NATO and South Korea, which 
results in less arms received under the FMS program as is observed in the data.  This is a 
valid argument, however, it does not disprove the theory that collective defense 
agreement treaty language affects Foreign Military Sales support. 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 The examination of Collective Defense Agreements and Foreign Military Sales 
metrics shows that there is a plausible connection between these two entities, however, 
there is scarce publically available data that definitively illustrates the reasons for this 
connection.  The lack of publically available data is not a new obstacle in the study of 
international relations, but it remains one that must be overcome to advance 
understanding of this field.  Other variables, such as foreign policy decision-making 
processes, diplomatic communications, geopolitical goals and military force composition 
are all elements that could potentially help advance understanding of the connection 




for these variables.  The data for some of these variables may not be available today but 
sometimes become publically available in time.  An example of this type of data is the 
Foreign Relations of the United States series that is compiled and published by the U.S. 
Department of State, which provides a “…historical record of major U.S. foreign policy 
decisions and significant diplomatic activity.”66  This type of information, which is only 
available thirty years after the events occurred, may provide additional insight into why 
the United States provides arms under the Foreign Military Sales program to some 
nations and not others.  Additional data such as this would be valuable in determining if a 
relationship between collective defense agreement language and Foreign Military Sales 
statistics is real or not, and determining this would significantly advance understanding of 
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Defense Trade in the United States-India Defense Relationship 
 
The Department of Defense’s recent Defense Strategic Guidance issued in 
January, 2012 reaffirms that in a post Cold-War era, the United States maintains global 
interests and responsibilities, but the document also emphasizes that the future security 
interests of the United States require a “rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region.67”  This 
renewed emphasis on the importance of Asia necessitates that the United States build and 
maintain positive relationships with several nations concurrently.  Within this framework, 
India is unquestionably an Asian nation that the United States will need to partner with in 
order to achieve desired security objectives.  Doing so will undoubtedly require a 
productive defense relationship between the two nations.   
 Descriptions such as defense relationship or defense partnership can reasonably 
be used when referring to the type of interaction that is sought by the United States and 
India, but terms such as alliance are too strong.  Relationship and partnership indicate 
that there is a mutually understood use and need by both nations for collaboration on 
some level when interests conveniently align, but the term “alliance” takes this 
collaboration to a level that is uncomfortable for either nation.  India has a history of not 
aligning itself with global factions and the United States does not wish to be entangled 
into potential conflicts between India and its regional neighbors if it can avoid it.  The 
important fact here is that the United States does want a meaningful and productive 
defense relationship with India, however, there are several obstacles that make this 
difficult.   
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I. U.S. Defense Relationship Goals 
Based on the available literature, the United States has two primary categories of 
goals for a relationship with India in the realm of defense matters: security and trade.  
With respect to security, the United States seeks to ensure the “free flow of commerce” 
through the Indian Ocean.68   It also seeks to counter terrorism in the South Asia region, 
an area where Sumit Ganguly and Andrew Scobell argue the United States could learn 
from India’s “extensive” experience combating domestic insurgencies and apply these 
lessons to current situations in Afghanistan.69  Lastly, in the category of security goals, 
the United States wishes to foster stability in Asia, particularly with respect to China and 
its emergence as a global power.   
In addition to security, the United States also seeks the economic benefits that 
come with a positive relationship with India in the defense arena.  Russia has served as 
India’s traditional supplier when it comes to procuring weapons and military equipment, 
but India has always coveted western military technology that has generally been 
unavailable in the absence of positive, defense relations with the United States.  For the 
United States, there is significant pressure from its defense industry base to ease 
restrictions on the export of U.S. defense technology to India in order to tap into the 
world’s most lucrative and fastest growing market for military equipment.70   
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The issue of trade is an important factor in the context of the U.S.-India defense 
relationship because it is a common thread that is interwoven with each of the main 
barriers to the type of defense relationship that both the United States and India seek. The 
available scholarship indicates that this defense relationship is inhibited by three main 
challenges.  The first obstacle revolves around the respective geopolitical relationships of 
India and the United States.  Specifically, each country’s respective relationship with 
Russia and Pakistan and the resulting impact of these relationships on the U.S.-India 
dynamic.  The second obstacle in the U.S.-India relationship involves India’s nuclear 
ambitions in the context of the United States’ longstanding opposition to the proliferation 
of nuclear weapons.  The final obstacle is the role that the trade of military technology 
plays in U.S.-India defense relations.  The main goal of this paper is to better understand 
the complex nature of the U.S.-India defense relationship in the context of these three 
important issues.    Through examination of these three areas, a clearer picture of how 
U.S.-India defense relations can be improved may emerge. 
To better understand the U.S.-India defense relationship and the potential avenues 
to improve it, this paper will analyze the current theories surrounding the three main 
impediments to the relationship.  As previously discussed, these impediments surround 
Russia and Pakistan’s role in the U.S.-India paradigm, nuclear proliferation and the trade 
of defense related technology.  This paper will then argue that while Russia and 
Pakistan’s function and nuclear proliferation are important factors in the U.S.-India 
relationship, it is the issue surrounding the trade of defense technology that stands out as 
most significant in terms of obstacles to the relationship.  Finally, this paper will argue 




India is likely to lead to improved relations between the two nations in the defense arena.  
This hypothesis is based on observations of India’s defense relationships with other 
nations, particularly Russia and Israel, and an investigation of resources such as the 
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program that are available to the United States to enhance 
relationships.       
 
II. Defense Relationship Impediments 
The United States and India’s respective relationships with other countries 
significantly affect their collaboration on defense matters.  Following the 9/11 attacks, the 
United States found it necessary to partner with Pakistan, India’s traditional rival, on 
security matters related to Afghanistan.  While this relationship has never been a 
particularly easy one for either the U.S. or Pakistan, it has been substantive enough to irk 
India, and serve as an obstacle to a productive United States-India partnership.  
Unfortunately, the United States has a history of partnering with Pakistan with the 
unintended consequence of offending India.   
When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in the 1980s, the U.S. provided 
military aid to Pakistan as a counter to Soviet aggression.  While the intent of the U.S. 
was not to threaten India or put it at a disadvantage militarily in the region, that is 
precisely what occurred.71 In this context, Sharif Shuja has correctly identified a 
contributing factor to the deficient U.S.-India defense relationship as the United States’ 
forced position to appease both Pakistan and India in order to achieve its regional 
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objectives.72  This appeasement is a delicate balancing act, because the United States 
must derive some benefit that warrants its involvement in the long-standing rivalry 
between Pakistan and India.  The course of action that the United States has frequently 
taken has arguably been one of parity.  For example, when the U.S. has offered sales of 
F-16 planes to Pakistan, it has also offered F-18 planes to India shortly after.73   
Many authorities on U.S.-India-Pakistan dynamics understandably offer differing 
views on the complex relationship.  Shehzad Qazi argues that the United States should 
move away from parity and establish separate relationships with India and Pakistan that 
reflect the current and predicted future environment, rather than treat them both equally.  
Specifically, Qazi suggests that the relationship with Pakistan should focus mainly on 
common, regional security goals, while the U.S. relationship with India should be more 
robust, encompassing trade and security issues while also embracing common democratic 
values.74 Paul Staniland, however, argues that it is “unrealistic” for the United States to 
fully “escape the muddle” of the complex U.S.-India-Pakistan relationship.75  Essentially, 
Staniland argues that Pakistan is important to other U.S. regional goals, such as the 
stability of Afghanistan, and any shift in attitude toward India that comes at Pakistan’s 
expense will jeopardize attainment of other U.S. objectives in the region.  As a result, any 
attempt to improve US-India cooperation in defense matters is likely to incur a cost in 
U.S.-Pakistan relations.  
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The hesitation on the part of the United States to provide India with military 
technology, such as aircraft, is not strictly related to U.S. relations with Pakistan and the 
latter’s rivalry with India.  In fact, it is India’s historic relationship with the Soviet Union, 
and today’s Russia, that has arguably played a greater role than Pakistan in impeding 
defense relations between the U.S. and India.  The available literature is in agreement that 
India has a desire for sophisticated, American military hardware, but Russia has always 
been a concern for the U.S.  The fear of sensitive U.S. technology falling into Russia’s 
possession has always been a clear obstacle to the type of defense relationship that both 
India and the United States seek, but this may not necessarily be as much of an obstacle 
today for two reasons.  First, Shuja argues that the United States is more “accepting” of 
India’s defense procurement relationship with Russia.76   This acceptance will necessarily 
fluctuate with the current state of relations between the U.S. and Russia, but it may be a 
requirement for any productive relationship with India since one of the main reasons that 
India consistently seeks out Russian military hardware, as opposed to U.S. hardware, is 
the belief that the United States is not a reliable supplier of technology.77  The second 
reason why India’s relationship with Russia should not be of significant concern to the 
United States is the 2002 signing of the General Security of Military Information 
Agreement between India and the United States.  This agreement prohibits the transfer of 
military technology and information by each nation to third parties, thus alleviating a 
primary concern for the United States.78   
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In addition to the geopolitical issues involving Pakistan and Russia, a significant 
barrier to defense relations between the United States and India surrounds the issue of 
nuclear proliferation.  Given the high premium that the United States places on 
preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, military cooperation between the U.S. 
and India came to a virtual halt following India’s 1998 nuclear test.  The sanctions 
imposed on India by the U.S. following the test essentially prevented any military-to-
military interaction or trade of defense technology from taking place, however, this 
obstacle has been reduced considerably over the past 10 years. 
Since the administration of George W. Bush, the United States has arguably 
treated India differently than other nuclear equipped nations with respect to non-
proliferation issues.  The traditional benchmark for the United States has required that 
countries agree to abide by the provisions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 
however, the Bush administration took steps to go outside of this traditional requirement 
in order to devise a framework where cooperation between the United States and India 
could be possible without the latter having to strictly adhere to the treaty.  While this was, 
and remains, a controversial strategy, it shows that the issue of nuclear proliferation is not 
necessarily a deal breaker and that there is room for a defense relationship to exist 
between the United States and India that accommodates each nation’s nuclear 
requirements.79  
Several scholars have offered motivations for the unique path that the United 
States has taken in its approach to India on the nuclear proliferation issue.  S. Paul Kapur 
suggests that limits to India’s expansion of nuclear weapons could result in the desired 
                                                          





goal of increased regional stability, particularly with respect to nuclear neighbors 
Pakistan and China, and also a reduction in the possibility of a nuclear weapon falling 
into the hands of terrorist organizations.80  While Kapur focuses mainly on the security 
implications of the United States’ nuclear non-proliferation efforts, Mark Fitzpatrick 
approaches the issue with a broader view in mind. 
Fitzpatrick indicates that the nuclear non-proliferation issue is important, not only 
for reasons of security, but also for its ability to overcome a long-standing obstacle to 
greater, strategic cooperation between the United States and India in other areas, such as 
trade.81  Fitzpatrick’s viewpoint is important because it identifies the overarching obstacle 
to the U.S.-India defense relationship, but it does not, however, provide the granular 
reasoning that links the nuclear non-proliferation issue directly to the desired defense 
relationship.    
Mira Kamdar offers a different perspective for U.S.-India cooperation in nuclear 
matters.  Kamdar argues that a significant reason for U.S. engagement with India is to 
gain access to India’s growing defense sales market.82  While trade is not the only reason 
for U.S. engagement with India, it is a tangible benefit for removing the proliferation 
obstacle from the US-India relationship.  Kapur, Fitzpatrick and Kamdar offer valid 
viewpoints on the role of nuclear non-proliferation in the overall relationship between the 
United States and India, but the issue’s direct impact on defense cooperation warrants 
further examination.  Kamdar’s views on the nuclear issue’s impact on the trade of 
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defense technology between the United States and India provide a logical reason for 
exploring the role of defense trade itself in the U.S.-India defense relationship. 
 
III. Significance of Defense Trade 
Nuclear proliferation, Pakistan and Russia, are not inconsequential obstacles to a 
productive relationship between the United States and India, but the standard schools of 
thought regarding these respective issues tend to indicate that they can be resolved, or at 
least managed, on some level that allows for collaboration on defense issues to take 
place.  Therefore, greater attention should be placed on exploring the trade aspect of the 
U.S.-India relationship that allows for the exchange of military technology.   
Military technology is important to India since it does not have an advanced 
capability to develop and produce military hardware indigenously.  As a result, India is 
forced to rely upon other nations for desired military equipment for its security needs.  
This reliance is particularly important given that two of India’s nearest geographic 
neighbors, China and Pakistan, are two of its greatest rivals.   
Traditionally, India’s most significant partner and supplier of military hardware 
has been Russia, and its predecessor, the Soviet Union.  India’s relationships with both 
the Soviet Union and Russia are significant to the hypothesis that defense trade can lead 
to broader defense relations with India because India’s initial relationship with the Soviet 
Union was based primarily on a strong need for access to military technology.   
Access to advanced military hardware has been important to India since its 
independence, but with respect to India’s approach to relationships in defense matters, 




develop the capability to produce these items itself.  This is an important point because 
acquisition and production of military equipment tend to form the limits of the types of 
defense partnerships that India seeks with other nations.  Holding true to its longstanding 
policy of non-alignment in international relations, India often confines itself from 
engaging in bilateral security alliances with other nations; especially dominant political 
powers such as the Soviet Union and the United States.  As a result of this, Ramesh 
Thakur characterizes the India-Soviet Union relationship as a “limited association.”83   
Beyond access to military hardware through purchase, a key benefit for India in 
its relationship with the Soviet Union was the ability to produce Soviet equipment in 
India under license.  This provided India with several advantages and is a relationship 
that it continued with Russia following the collapse of the Soviet Union.  Through the 
ability to produce military equipment domestically, India would slowly be able to 
develop the technical expertise that is necessary to move away from reliance upon 
foreign nations for technology and move towards a self-sustaining capability to develop 
and produce equipment internally.  A key reason why India gravitated towards the Soviet 
Union in this respect is that the United States and other Western nations were wary of 
losing control of sensitive technology by allowing their products to be produced by 
India.84  As a result of India’s initial supplier-buyer relationship with the Soviet Union for 
defense technology, its relationship with the Soviets, and today’s Russia, slowly 
expanded to involve joint research and development of military items.  One key example 
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of this is the Brahmos anti-ship missile that has been jointly developed by India and 
Russia.85  
The example of India’s relationship with the Soviet Union, and later Russia, in 
defense matters shows that military technology and self-sufficiency have long formed the 
core of India’s meaningful defense relationships with other nations.  Another key 
example of this fact is India’s defense relationship with Israel.  Israel is arguably not as 
politically or militarily dominant as the former Soviet Union once was, yet it enjoys a 
similar defense relationship with India.  This relationship, based on the trade and joint 
development of military technology, is significant to the hypothesis that defense trade can 
improve defense relations with India because it shows that these types of defense 
relationships with India can progress along a similar track, regardless of the size or 
prominence of the country on the world stage.  What matters most is the quality of the 
nation’s military technology and its willingness to serve as a suppler to India without 
restriction. 
Efraim Inbar and Alvite Singh Ningthoujam indicate that India’s defense 
relationship with Israel was founded on realist principles.86  Specifically, they note that 
“similar goals and rationales behind arms modernization, buildup and export brought the 
two nations closer together.”87  
Building upon the theme of the importance of defense technology in the 
relationship, Harsh V. Pant shows that one of the strengths of the India-Israel defense 
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relationship, and a key reason for why India is willing to partner with Israel in the 
defense arena, is the latter’s record of reliability for supplying India with vital military 
equipment during times when other nations, namely the United States and Western 
Europe, have been unwilling to do so for political reasons.  India’s several conflicts with 
neighboring Pakistan form the majority of these instances.88    
Russia and Israel’s willingness to supply military technology to India during 
periods when other nations have been unwilling to do so is an important factor in India’s 
defense relations with these respective nations.  Equally important is the path to self-
sufficiency in the production of sophisticated military technology that comes with a 
relationship with each of the countries, particularly Israel.     
 According to Pant, a relationship with Israel provides two specific advantages for 
India.  First, Israel’s expertise with upgrading Soviet and Russian military technology 
allows for diversification of India’s defense suppliers to mitigate risk.  When Moscow 
objects to India’s course of action, India can turn to Israel to repair or upgrade its 
predominantly Russian-made military equipment.89   The second advantage is the 
expertise and self-sufficiency that India derives from joint development endeavors with 
Israel.  The India-Israel defense relationship that initially began as a “buyer-seller” 
arrangement has evolved into a more robust association where the two countries are 
jointly developing and producing antimissile systems, high-tech radar and night-vision 
equipment.90  This shows that despite other variables, such as India’s large Muslim 
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population, India can have a pragmatic defense relationship with Israel that is based 
primarily on trade.91  
The examples of Russia and Israel show that defense trade is important to India, 
thus making it possible for the United States to leverage its own Foreign Military Sales 
(FMS) program as a resource to improve its defense relationship with India.  FMS can be 
employed by the United States as a powerful tool to enhance US-India defense relations 
due to its unique role in transferring U.S. military technology to foreign nations.  J.P. 
Poon explains that unlike other nations, where the private sector deals directly with the 
foreign government, the trade of military technology between the United States and other 
countries takes place on a “government-to-government” basis.92  Through FMS, the US 
Department of Defense acts as the main agent to procure military equipment for foreign 
entities.93  As a result, military technology and its availability to foreign nations such as 
India fulfill more of a diplomatic role rather than a mainly economic one.  Since access to 
desired U.S. military technology is dependent upon Pentagon approval, that access can be 
conditioned upon enhanced collaboration in other defense areas, such as joint training or 
regional counter-terrorism activities.   
Though it is a powerful tool, the Foreign Military Sales program is not without its 
disadvantages.  Because the sale of military hardware under the program is controlled by 
the US Government, it directly ties into India’s concerns of the ability of the United 
States to serve as a reliable supplier of military technology.   Amer Latif explains the 
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United States’ reluctance to transfer sensitive military technology to India as a significant 
obstacle in the defense relationship of the two countries.  Specifically, Latif portrays the 
United States’ views of its technology as a “strategic commodity,” where decisions 
regarding its availability to foreign partners are made primarily from a national security 
standpoint.94  In contrast, Latif further explains that one of the main reasons why Europe 
and Russia have greater success when dealing with India in the defense trade arena is 
because they view military technology primarily as a “commercial commodity” that is 
developed with the intent that it will eventually be sold to foreign countries.95  The 
United States has a well-founded reason to keep its advanced military technology secure, 
though it will need to reconcile its technology safeguarding practices with its other 
national security objectives if it wishes to advance in its defense relationship with India. 
 An additional weakness of the Foreign Military Sales program in the context of 
use as a negotiating tool for improved defense relations with India is India’s strong 
tradition of non-alignment in international affairs.  While sophisticated US military 
technology may be enticing to India, it may not be enough for India to collaborate with 
the United States in defense matters on a level that the latter seeks. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
Several factors affect the defense relationship between the United States and India.  
Nuclear proliferation and diplomatic relations are considerable challenges, but they are 
not insurmountable ones.  The main reason why trade stands out from issues such as 
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nuclear proliferation or the United States’ and India’s respective relations with Pakistan 
and Russia, is that it is both a desired end goal for the United States and an obstacle to 
defense relations.  It is also affected, in part, by each of the previously identified 
obstacles.  The relationship between the United States and India with respect to military 
technology is not entirely hampered by the relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan.  
India would likely procure American military hardware, if available, for its quality and 
effectiveness regardless of whether the U.S. was friendly with Pakistan or not.  At a 
minimum, India would want access to the same military technology as its rivals.  India’s 
main concern surrounds the issue of supply reliability.  Also, with respect to nuclear 
weapons, limiting their proliferation is a well-known goal for the United States, however, 
the US relationship with Israel provides precedent for the existence of a healthy defense 
trade relationship between the U.S. and another nation whose nuclear policy is considered 
ambiguous at best. 
The trade of defense technology is a primary component of the defense 
relationship between the U.S. and India, and also contains elements of both a goal and an 
obstacle that other barriers lack.  The U.S. and India each want to benefit from 
exchanging military technology, which represents a core element of the defense 
partnership, but this issue of trade is also an obstacle in itself.  Some issues regarding 
defense trade have been identified and partially overcome, such as the issue of the 
protection of military technology and the signing of the General Security of Military 
Information Agreement as a solution, yet the ideal defense relationship does not yet exist.  
Further research that focuses specifically on defense trade may identify and explain the 




improvement in the trade of defense technology will likely result in an improvement in 
the defense relationship.  More broadly, investigation of the unique role of defense trade 
in international relations may illuminate how it is considered as a factor in the 

























The research and analysis demonstrated in this thesis portfolio Illustrated the 
significance of defense trade in defense relations.  The portfolio has shown that defense 
trade data can illustrate the importance that a country places on its defense relationship 
with another.  The portfolio has also shown that defense trade statistics are one of the few 
types of publically available data that is quantifiable and directly relates to defense 
relations, particularly in the case of the United States. 
The Asia “Pivot”: Indications of Existence Through Analysis of Foreign Military 
Sales effective demonstrates that Foreign Military Sales arms transaction metrics can 
serve as a proxy for the general level of importance that the United States places on 
recipient nations.  The study interestingly showed that U.S. attention, with respect to 
arms sales, shifted from Europe to the Asia-Pacific region, while its interest in the Middle 
East remained largely unaffected.   
The Influence of Collective Defense Agreements on U.S. Foreign Military Sales 
continued the overall portfolio’s interest in Foreign Military Sales and focused on 
language used in the seven collective defense agreements that the United States currently 
participates in.  This research identified the potential causal relationship between how 
subjects are addressed in defense pact treaties and the effect on defense trade.  Future 
research in this area should seek to explore aspects of the links between defense trade and 
collective defense arrangements.  The research in this portfolio approached questions 
from the perspective of the United States, however, the findings in this portfolio may or 




variable that should be examined, for which data is not readily available, is the specific 
type of arms and military equipment that is traded.  Having data that shows the relative 
type and cost of military equipment that is trade would significantly improve 
understanding of arms trade.  Unfortunately, given the nature of this information, it is not 
readily available, and what little is accessible to the public is mainly found in Western 
democratic nations. 
  Defense Trade in the United States-India Relationship focuses less on defense 
trade metrics and primarily explores the role of defense trade in a significant relationship.  
This paper shows that the United States and India have security interests that align, yet 
their relationship is plagued with significant obstacles.  The paper finds that despite these 
impediments, defense trade is an area where both nations can improve their relationship, 
and that both nations have the ostensible motivation to do so.  Since the interest of both 
nations in improving relations in the defense arena was largely formed in the George W. 
Bush administration, and therefore is in fairly nascent stages, little information is 
available that would indicate if the relationship is improving, declining or remaining 
steady.  The research and findings provided in the other two studies in this thesis 
portfolio lay a potential foundation for beginning to answer this question.  The proven 
effectiveness of using defense trade data as a proxy for illustrating the state of a defense 
relationship would be effective in an examination of United States-India relations.  Only 
within the last decade has the United States provided India with military technology and 
equipment.  This would indicate that the two countries have improved defense relations, 
however longer term evaluation of the state of their arms trade will indicate if the 




The individual research in this thesis portfolio is complimentary in nature.  Each 
of the three studies explores a different facet of the relationship between defense trade 
and defense relations.  As with any field of study, there are always questions that remain 
and new sets of data and variables to explore, however, what has been achieved in this 
body of work is additional progress, however incremental, in advancing existing 
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